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Voluntary repatriation of refugees has 
been traditionally considered not only one 
of the three possible durable solutions, 
together with resettlement in a third 
country and local integration, but, 
actually, the best of those three solutions. 
Paradoxically, when looking at the 
Indochinese refugees, it appears that it 
has been the least applied solution, and 
also the most controversial. Since 1975, 
with some exceptions, resettlement in a 
third country has been the overall 
solution. A staggering 1,100,000 
Indochinese refugees left for a third 
country in the past 14 years. This is 
certainly a major accomplishment and a 
true sign of international solidarity in the 
face of a human tragedy of such 
dimensions. 
Resettlement on a comparable scale 
could not, however, go on indefinitely. 
The cost of resettling a single refugee 
amounts to several thousands of dollars 
in the initial phase, and there are 
additional costs afterwards: it is not only 
a matter of transportation and initial 
"start-up" costs, but the costs may go on 
for several years. If we take a 
conservative estimate of US $5,000 per 
person, multiplied by the 1,100,000 
mentioned above, we reach a figure in the 
order of several billion dollars. 
Furthermore, the Indochinese refugees 
problem is but one of the refugee 
situations presently existing. Of course, 
not all require that such a large number of 
persons to be resettled, and, in most cases 
- in Africa, in Central America or for the 
Afghans - it is a matter of awaiting for a 
change of circumstances which will 
enable the refugees to return home. 
Every year, however, traditional 
resettlement countries do provide several 
tens of thousands of resettlement places 
for refugees all over the world. But the 
priority in allocating these resettlement 
slots may vary. The Indochinese refugee 
problem has been with us for close to 
fifteen years and it is not perceived today 
with the same degree of urgency as in 
1975-1980. Time and the numbers 
involved, (that, far from decreasing, have 
tended to recently increase) explain the 
reactions by the countries involved, 
especially those providing first asylum. 
A further question has appeared with 
increasing insistence: to what extent 
resettlement, which has been seen for 
years as a panacea, has not become part of 
the problem? A new concept which has 
emerged is the "push and pull" factor. In 
analyzing the reasons which have caused 
this situation to linger, a distinction has 
been made between those factors which 
are linked to the situation (real or 
perceived) in the country of origin and 
which "push people to leave, and those 
external factors, such as the expectation of 
a better life, (i.e., increased economic 
opportunities, better education, better 
health coverage, etc.) which "pull" people 
to leave their country. The 1979 
International Conference on Indochinese 
Refugees, linked the provision of first 
asylum to resettlement in a developed 
country. This is at the origin of the 
impressive number of Indochinese 
refugees resettled, but it may also explain 
why, in the mind of later arrivals and 
departees, an expectation of 
automatic resettlement in the West was 
created. Some may, therefore, argue that 
resettlement had turned into the mythical 
snake that eats its own tail: more refugees, 
more resettlement, more resettlement, 
more refugees. 
Of course, this element cannot be 
taken in isolation, but it may contribute to 
explaining what has euphemistically been 
called "compassion fatigue". 
Since 1975, the overall situation in the 
region has changed, mostly for the better, 
but some deep shadows remain. As a 
result of a local "glasnost," regional 
relations have improved and some 
changes have occurred in the 
governments of the countries of origin. If 
these trends continue, we can hope that 
fewer people will leave and more will be 
willing to return. The picture, however, 
continues to show dark clouds. 
Another concept, which was 
introduced in the study of the Indochinese 
refugees phenomenon, was the one of 
"root causes," and tackling them to solve 
the problem. Although this notion has 
been essentially used in a political context, 
it has acquired relevance when 
considering the increasingly heard 
statement that the majority of asylum- 
seekers are "economic migrants:' leaving 
their country because of economic 
hardship. Continuing in the same l i e  of 
thought, there was a perception that the 
renewed outflow was essentially due to 
economic reasons, that resettlement could 
not keep pace with the outflow. This 
provided the justification for increasingly 
harsh measures, which have been dubbed 
"humane deterrence." This "humane 
deterrence" has certainly been deadly for a 
large number of human beings. 
A Chinese proverb says that times of 
crisis are times of danger and opportunity. 
It is because of this real danger that there 
is an opportunity to salvage the 
threatened principle of first asylum. The 
occasion was there to review both the 
achievements and the mistakes of the past 
and try to come forward with a new 
approach. It is in the course of this search 
that the option of voluntary repatriation 
as the ideal solution has been 
rediscovered. 
As we have seen, the conjunction of 
two factors - decreased opportunities for 
resettlement and the changing situation in 
the country of origin - improved the 
climate in the region and the realization 
that old remedies were no cure anymore. 
Efforts were revived to look at voluntary 
repatriation as the most appropriate 
solution, at least for a large number of 
refugees and asylum-seekers. This, 
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however, is easier said than done, as there 
are a number of conditions which need to 
be fulfilled. In theory, there are two sets 
of conditions, at the individual level and 
at the governmental level. 
At the individual level, the first and 
foremost condition is the best interest of 
the refugees themselves: this implies that 
conditions conductive to the return of the 
refugees exist or be created. They include 
the existence of peace and security, as well 
as an economic climate where individuals 
can fulfill their basic needs. Clearly, such 
conditions encompass political, economic 
and social elements, which are the 
responsibility of the countries of origin. 
These conditions must not only exist, 
they also have to be known by the 
refugees and asylum-seekers concerned. 
Unbiased information must be available 
to the persons concerned. 
It is to some extent arbitrary to 
separate the conditions required at the 
level of the individuals concerned and at 
the level of the authorities, as they are the 
two sides of the same coin. Furthermore, 
those conditions, as we have listed them 
- a proper climate, good information, 
and the voluntary character of the return 
- appear clear, if not necessarily simple. 
Reality is infinitely more complex. 
The creation of a climate conducive to 
the return of people can include elements 
which might put into question the 
fundamentals on which some 
governments operate their philosophy 
and their ideology; these might have 
conditioned the economic and social 
orientation which may have been the 
primary reason for the outflow. Although 
recent events in Eastern Europe tend to 
show that nothing is fixed forever, 
changes of such magnitude take time. 
Additionally, in a world which is 
increasingly a global village, such changes 
may have to be encouraged by the 
international community, the 
superpowers, regional neighbours or 
economic partners. All these 
considerations have brought us very far 
from the strictly humanitarian concerns 
which, in an ideal world, should be the 
first and only consideration when looking 
at a refugee problem. 
Good information is the second 
element in the equation, but it may be 
only marginally easier to define and then 
achieve. Good information could be 
defined as comprehensive and objective 
information surrounding a possible 
return. Ongoing debates tend to show 
that increasing the means of information- 
sharing has not necessarily meant better 
information. Lenin stated that 
information was but one of the elements 
of a policy and must be used to reach the 
objectives set by this policy. The use of 
information to achieve policy objectives 
- sometimes called propaganda - is not 
a monopoly of communism. To a greater 
or lesser extent the temptation exists for 
governments to use the information for 
their own purposes. As the Jesuits say, 
one can also sin by omission. Can 
information be neutral? Where does 
neutral information stop and propaganda 
start? If promotion of voluntary 
repatriation includes the provision of 
information of conditions in the country 
of origin, how can one ensure that such 
information is both correct and 
exhaustive? 
Turning now to the essential element 
of "voluntary repatriation," i.e., its 
voluntary character, this implies that the 
individual be in a position to express his 
or her own free will and that his or her 
decision be respected. Simple enough to 
say, but much harder to ensure. If the 
conditions of existence in the refugee 
camps are excessively harsh, can a 
decision taken in such a context be 
considered free? Supposing that we are 
satisfied that the decision has indeed been 
taken bearing in mind all the information 
available and devoid of any external 
pressure, but, as external observers, we 
feel that for a number of different reasons, 
it is not advisable to return, can we 
preempt the decision of the person 
concerned and decide on his behalf as to 
what we feel is best for him? Clearly, we 
cannot advocate the principle of a 
decision based on free will and then be 
the ones not to respect this same will. In 
the context of the Indochinese refugees, 
this is not a theoretical question. 
There is an additional problem which 
has recently arisen in the context of the 
Comprehensive Plan of Action related to 
the Vietnamese Boat People and approved 
at the International Conference held in 
June 1989 in Geneva: traditionally, 
voluntary repatriation is one of the three 
durable solutions to benefit refugees. By 
saying refugees, it implies that the 
persons concerned are either prima facie 
(i.e., without the need to go through a 
refugee determination procedure) 
refugees, or have been recognized as such 
after undergoing such a procedure. In the 
case of the Boat People, the concept of 
voluntary return is being tentatively 
expanded to cover those both screened 
out and those who may not yet have 
undergone the refugee determination 
procedure. The implications of such an 
expansion must still be fully assessed. 
Humanitarian refugee law is not a 
fixed set of universally accepted rules, but 
rather, a constantly evolving matter, based 
on existing refugee problems. For its size, 
and for its political relevance, the 
Indochinese refugees problem has had 
and continues to have a major impact on 
the evolution of refugee law. It has 
further highlighted the complexities of 
the subject and continues to be relevant 
both by its adherence to traditionally 
accepted rules of conduct as well as for 
the &w issues or the new way to tackle 
old issues that it has brought to light. A 
brief presentation of the present situation 
and of the prospects for the future may 
help to further highlight the link between 
the issues discussed above and the plight 
of the Indochinese refugees. For clarity's 
sake, however, the three groups, Lao, 
Khmer and Vietnamese, must be treated 
separately. 
Organized voluntary repatriation for 
the Lao started in 1980. It was, however, 
very slow: from 1980 to 1988, some 3,400 
repatriated voluntarily. Since January 
1989 over 1,200 more have returned. It 
has been agreed that over 300 per month 
could return, and this figure will 
hopefully be increased to 500 the near 
future. This dramatic improvement is 
due to a number of reasons: changes in 
the country of origin, improved bilateral 
Lao-Thai relations, and an active 
promotion campaign on the part of the 
UNHCR. As for the return, the Lao 
authorities make no distinction between 
the voluntary repatriates and the 
involuntary return of the screened-out. 
They all benefit from the same treatment. 
It must also be noted that a refugee status 
determination procedure has existed since 
1985. Prior to this procedure, there were 
some 3,000 to 4,000 arrivals per month. 
Presently, they number some 3,000 to 
4P00 per year. The consequences of the 
establishment of a screening procedure 
are far-reaching. First, resettlement was 
the only durable solution available, but it 
was available to all new arrivals only to 
the extent that they were all considered as 
refugees. It would, therefore, appear that 
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severing the link between reaching 
Thailand and expecting resettlement in 
the West has decreased considerably the 
"pull factor." The screening procedure 
has, at the same time, contributed to the 
safeguard of asylum and the protection of 
refugees while discouraging people 
without a well-founded fear of 
persecution to flee their country and 
languish in refugee camps. Furthermore, 
for the first time ever, in a region where 
only two countries are signatories to the 
International Instruments, acceptance and 
use of established procedures in the 
treatment and protection of asylum- 
seekers have been adopted. This in itself 
is a remarkable and far-reaching 
accomplishment. 
With respect to Khmer refugees, the 
only known large voluntary repatriation 
operation took place in 1980 and 
concerned some 9,000 persons. While it 
was clear at the time that they were fully 
aware of the dangerous situation existing 
in the area where they wished to return - 
and they indeed wanted, of their own free 
will, to return -, this operation was the 
source of great polemics on the part of 
those who felt that, whatever the decision 
of the people themselves, they should not 
be allowed to return. 
Since then, and apart for a handful of 
people, there has been no voluntary 
repatriation as such. Such a large-scale 
operation would benefit the border 
population, numbering some 300,000. 
They are called displaced persons rather 
than refugees, but it has been agreed that 
they should benefit, when the time comes, 
from the treatment reserved to refugees 
under a large-scale repatriation operation. 
It has also been agreed that voluntary 
repatriation would be the best solution for 
the large majority and, to our knowledge, 
that same majority wishes to repatriate 
when the time comes. At present, 
however, the conditions conductive to 
repatriation d o  not appear to exist. 
Observers are also disturbed by the way 
information provided to the border 
population is lacking both in accuracy 
and exhaustiveness. It is not easy, in the 
present situation, to determine what is 
indeed, accurate and exhaustive 
information. In a conflict situation, 
information is part of "psychological 
warfare" and, as such, is the subject of 
much manipulation. Two other issues 
must also be considered, as they are 
intimately linked to those developed 
above. While there is a consensus that an 
eventual voluntary repatriation will be 
ideal for the majority of the people, there 
must be an equal consensus that those 
who may decide, be it temporarily or 
permanently, not to repatriate, be allowed 
to do so. Voluntary repatriation without 
voluntary non-repatriation would be void 
of meaning. 
By the same token, while it is 
agreed that the situation in the 
country of origin is presently not 
conducive to large-scale return, and that a 
comprehensive settlement may indeed be 
the key, any person or group of any size 
who, knowing the situation to the extent 
possible, freely, decide to return, should 
not face the obstacle of others 
determining for them, and for whatever 
purpose, that now is not the right time. 
This however, is easier said than done. 
On the issue of repatriation, it is the 
Vietnamese refugees, not necessarily the 
largest in size, that has given rise to 
heated and emotional debates and has 
also been a source of major concern to 
those humanitarian organizations 
involved in their protection and 
assistance. They are-the only group 
which has sought asylum in a large 
number of countries, primarily in South 
East Asia. They are also the only group 
which has benefitted from a blanket 
recognition of their refugee status for 
almost fifteen years since the events that 
gave rise to their fleeing their country of 
origin. But it sowed the seeds of the crisis 
that bloomed in 1987-1988 and led to the 
1989 International Conference. By 
linking, in 1979, first asylum - which is a 
fundamental principle - to the provision 
of a technical solution, i.e., resettlement, 
the principle has been reduced to depend 
on the success of the technical solution: 
asylum was as good as resettlement; a 
decrease in one would threaten the other. 
Furthermore, resettlement is the only 
solution applicable, has created an 
expectation and become almost an 
acquired right. The drama of 
resettlement, which was only belatedly 
perceived, was that it was the equivalent 
of digging a hole in the sand: the more 
one digs, the more sand falls in the hole. 
Clearly, resettlement could not any more 
keep up with the rate of arrivals. The 
reaction of the first asylum countries was 
to question the of first asylum. 
Concern for loss of life and the sufferings 
of thousands, as well as the seeming 
endlessness of the problem, brought all 
concerned to the 1989 International 
Conference. A Comprehensive Plan of 
Action (CPA) was endorsed. It is 
composed of a set of measures, which 
include unequivocally the reaffirmation of 
the principle of first asylum, the 
establishment of a refugee screening 
procedure and the active promotion of 
voluntary repatriation. The continuing 
high number of arrivals may be explained 
by the fact that one cannot, overnight, 
hope to stop a train which has been 
running full speed for fourteen years. It is 
also true that the emotional content of the 
issue is far higher than for other refugee 
groups. The screening procedure, which 
is internationally accepted and 
successfully implemented for the Lao, for 
instance, meets with resistance by some 
perhaps well-meaning but ultimately 
misguided groups when it comes to the 
Vietnamese. There is greater resistance 
still to the corollary of any refugee 
determination procedure, the treatment of 
screened out. 
In order to overcome a potential 
failure of the CPA, which would have 
disastrous consequences both for the 
Vietnamese asylum-seekers and regarding 
the principle of first asylum, discussions 
are underway to extend the benefit of 
voluntary return to include those not 
having yet undergone the refugee status 
determination procedure as well as to 
those having already been screened out. 
This is, of course, an exceptional and 
transitory measure, which aims at 
preserving the hardly won consensus. 
These efforts have already met with some 
success: close to one thousand have 
already returned and over 1,100 
applicants are in the pipeline. If the Lao 
experience is a lesson, we can expect that, 
albeit slow to start, the repatriation 
exercise will pick up steam and become a 
major element in solving a long-standing 
problem. Within an acceptable time 
frame, a chance must be given for these 
efforts to succeed. The CPA represents 
the light at the end of the tunnel, a long 
and dark tunnel. 
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